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SOME TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS*
By RALPH H. DWA-N**
A NY LAWYER worth his salt who has a tax problem will want
to start with the statute itself. He will not be satisfied with
any paraphrase of the statute appearing in an official or unofficial
publication. Even when he has the text of the statute before him,
he will sometimes, out of an abundance of caution, want to be sure
that he has the true text established by law as such. Thus it may
be worth while to consider where a lawyer finds the true text of
the internal revenue statutes.
A brief survey of Federal statutes as a whole' may be helpful.
A convenient starting point is the Revised Statutes, which were a
complete revision of all Federal permanent public statutes enacted
before December 1. 1873. That is the only general revision enacted
as law in the, history of the Federal statutes. The United States
Code is only prima facie the law, and it is often necessary to check
the United States Code against the Revised Statutes or against the
later Statutes at Large. There have, however, been a few in-
stances of revisions of particular parts of the Federal statutes, viz.,
the Criminal Code. the judicial Code, and the Internal Revenue
Code.
The Internal Revenue Code was enacted on February 10,
1939 and has been printed as Part 1 of Volume 53 of the Statutes
at Large. The enacting statute specifically provides that the "In-
ternal Revenue Title" is "enacted into law." M[oreover, section 8
of the enacting statute provides
"Copies of this act printed at the Government Printing
Office and bearing its imprint shall be conclusive evidence
of the original Internal Revenue Code ii the custody of the
Secretary of State."
*The statements made in this article represent only the personal vtews
of the author; they do not in any way reflect the official views of any gov-
ermient department or officer.
This article is, to some extent, a supplement to D\%an and Feidler,
The Federal Statutes-Their History and Use, (1938) 2- M[iNnEsorA
LAw REvIw 1008.
**Assistant Chief Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Treasury De-
partment of the United States, Washington, D. C.
'For a fuller discussion, see D~wan and Feidler, The Federal Statutes-
Their History and Use, (1938) 22 MfINNESoTA LAw RE Ew 1008.
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Since the enactment ot the Internal Revenue Code, changes in
the internal revenue laws generally have been in the form of
amendments to particular sections of the Code or additions of
new sections. Thus the Code as amended contains, with few
exceptions, the internal revenue statutes now in effect. However,
section 5 of the enacting statute provides that provisions of law
in force on January 2, 1939 remain in force until the correspond-
ing provisions of the Code take effect. The operation of that pro-
vision is illustrated by Section 1 of Chapter 1, the income tax
chapter which provides
" The provisions of this chapter shall apply only to tax-
able years beginning atter December 31, 1938. Income,
war-profits, and excess-profits taxes for taxable years be-
ginning prior to January 1, 1939, shall not be affected by
the provisions of this chapter, but shall remain subject to
the applicable provisions of the Revenue Act of 1938 and
prior revenue acts. except as such provisions are modified
by legislation enacted subsequent to the Revenue Act of
1938."
Since it is still necessary, at times, to ascertain the statutes
applicable to taxable years prior to 1939, a few remarks may be
made about those statutes. Beginning with the Revenue Act of
1918.'2 which also designates certain earlier acts as the Revenue
Act of 1916 and the Revenue Act of 1917, it has been customary
to designate in the statutes themselves certain acts as revenue acts
of a particular year, e.g., the Revenue Act of 1921, the Revenue
-\ct of 1924, the Revenue Act of 1926, etc.
That useful practice has continued since the enactment of the
Code, thus the most recent general revenue act is designated as
the "Revenue Act of 194 3 .' ' 1 However, certain revenue statutes
of limited scope have been given other names, thus the so-called
pay-as-you-go statute is designated as the "Current Tax Payment
Xct of 1943 . " 4
The revenue acts prior to the Code were quite complete in
themselves in that they usually repeated definitions and other
provisions appearing in earlier revenue acts. Each revenue act
applied only to certain designated periods or events. Those revenue
acts, however did not purport to cover the whole field of internal
revenue taxation. It was often necessary, as to particular matters.
to examine the Revised Statutes, amendments thereto, and sub-
sequent provisions in the Statutes at Large.
-40 Stat. at L. 1057, sec. 1403-1405.3Public Law 235, 78th Cong., 2d Sess.
4Public Law 68, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.
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Although, as we have seen, the Internal Revenue Code was
enacted as- law and not merely as prima facie the law, there is
one qualification which should be borne in mind. Section 6 of the
enacting statute provides
"The arrangement and classification of the several pro-
visions of the Internal Revenue Title have been made for
the purpose of a more convenient and orderly arrangement
of the same, and, therefore, no iiference, implication or pre-
sumption of legislative construction shall be drawn or made
by- reason of the location or grouping of any particular
section or provision or portion thereof, nor shall any out-
line, analysis, cross reference, or descriptive matter relat-
ing to the contents of said Title be given any legal effect."
There has been considerable dispute about the propriety of
using the title of a statute or the heading of a section in a statute
as an aid to construction. Apparently the doubt arose out of the
fact that the early legislative practice was to enact a statute with-
out title or section headings which were subsequently added by
the clerk or the printer.5 Since that practice no longer prevails, it
would seem that such titles and headings should be available as an
aid to construction where the body of the statute or section is am-
biguous. In any event, the Supreme Court has so held.'
The section of the statute enacting the Internal Revenue Code,
just quoted, apparently changes the rule with respect to section
headings in the Code. That section, however, probably would have
no effect with respect to a heading which -was already in a revenue
act before the Code was enacted.- An interesing question arises
with respect to new sections with appropriate headings added to
the Code by subsequent revenue acts. It might be argued that
since the new section becomes a part of the Code it is subject to
the provisions of Section 6. On the other hand, Section 6 refers
to arrangements and classifications which "have been made."
Thus, it is arguable that Section 6 refers only to classifications
and arrangements made at the time of the original enactment of
the Code and not to the headings of sections added to the Code at
a later date. In a recent case," the Tax Court of the United States
relied upon the heading of a section of the Code added by the
5See 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3rd ed., by Frank E. Horack,
Jr., 1943), sections 4802 and 4903.
GKnowlton v. Mfoore, (1900) 178 U. S. 41, 65, 20 Sup. Ct. 747, 44 L. Ed.
969; Maguire v. Commissioner, (.1941) 313 U. S. 1, 9, 61 Sup. Ct. 789, 85
L. Ed. 1149.
-That seems to be assumed, without discussion, in Fawcett v. Coin-
missioner, (1944) 3 T. C. No. 378Keeble v. Commissioner, (1943) 2 T. C. No. 148.
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Revenue Act of 1939 without any reference to Section 6 of the
Code.
In connection with this matter of section headings, it may be
added that extensive use of such headings in internal revenue
statutes seems to have started at a rather late date, i.e.. with
the Revenue Act of 1928," but has been continued in subsequent
revenue acts.
After he has examined the text of the Internal Revenue
statute, the lawyer normally will next consult the regulations
promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with the
approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant to statutory
authority Regulations differ considerably in form and purpose
A useful classification has been made by recent writers on the
subject," including those who prepared the report of the Attorney
General's Cominuttee on Administrative Procedure," viz.. the dis-
trnction between "interpretative" regulations and "legislative"
regulations.
The principal purpose ot interpretative regulations is pedagogi-
cal. i.e., to explain and illustrate the operation ot the statute. The
method usually pursued is the sound pedagogical one of proceeding
from the simple to the complex.
It is not a part of our legislative tradition to include illustra-
tions in the statute itself, although recent revenue statutes have
included tables. e.g.. the wage bracket withholding tables mu the
Current Tax Payment Act of 1943.12 Interestingly enough. wne
internal revenue statute, the Public Salarv Tax Act of 1930
expressly refers to the "application of the doctrines" mu threc
named decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Illustrations
do appear in Congressional Committee reports and are often
carried into the regulations, but the regulations usually go further
than the reports in explanation and illustration.
The draftsmen of the regulations must keep in nind the lium-
945 Stat. at L. 791.1OLee, Legislative and Interpretive Regulations, (1940) 29 Georgetown
L. Journ. 1 (collecting the earlier literature on the subject at p. 2. n. I)
Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case. (1940) 40 Col.
L. Rev. 252, Surrey, The Scope and Effect of Treasury Regulations under
the Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes, (1940) 88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 556 Gris-
wold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, (1941) 54 Harv. L. Rev.
398. 1 Final Report, (U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 1941) The report (at
p. 100) uses the term "interpretative," but, instead of using the terem "legis-
lative," speaks of "legally binding regulations" and "statutory regulations."
1-Public Law 68. 78th Cong., 1st Sess.
1353 Stat. at L. 574, 576, sec. 203.
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tations which the courts have placed upon the use of Commttee
reports, debates, etc., as aids to construction, at least where the
validity of the regulations may be questioned in court.", However,
where a proposed regulation favors the taxpayers and therefore
will not .be litigated, more latitude is properly recognized. %n
example may be found in Regulations 115 relating to the collec-
tion of income taxes at the source on wages, tinder the Current
Tax Payment Act of 1943.' The statute requires "every employee
receiving wages"' 18 to furnish his employer with a withholding
exemption -certificate relating to his family status. Although the
statute contains no express exceptions, the regulations state17 that
no certificate is required from an individual under 16 years of age
performing services in the distribution of newspapers unless such
individual is paid wages in excess of the withholding exemption.
That exception is entirely justified in' view of the general purpose
of the statute to use ;vithholding as a collection device and in view
of the desirability of simplifying administration.
The statute itself and its legislative history are not the only
sources from which interpretative regulations may be derived.
Textile Mills Securities Corp v. Comnissioner of Internal
Re-aemtels involved a regulation, expressly referred to by the
Court as an "interpretative regulation," which provided that sums
of money expended for lobbying purposes are not "ordinary and
necessary expenses" deductible from the gross income of corpora-
tions: The Court pointed out that the words "ordinary and neces-
sa," are not so clear and unambiguous as to leave no room for
'
4 See Dwan and Feidler, The Federal Statutes-Their History and
Use, (1938) 22 AfIVNESOrA LAw Rsvrsw 1008, 1027-29. Probably the best
statement of the limitations by the Supreme Court is in a non-revenue case,
Wright v., Vinton Branch of Mfountain Trust Bank, (1937) 300 U. S. 440,
57 Sup. Ct. 556, 81 L. Ed. 736, in which Mr. justice Brandeis stated (at
p. 463-464, n. 8) "Where the meaning of legislation is doubtful or obscure,
resort may be had in its interpretation to reports of Congressional com-
mittees which have considered the measure * * *; to exposition of the bill
on the floor of Congress by those m charge of or sponsoring the legtsla-
tion ***; to comparison of successive drafts or amendments of the measure
* * *; and to the debates in general in order to show common agreement
on purpose as distinguished from interpretation of particular phrase-
ology * * *"15Public Law 68, 78th Cong., 1st Sess..
161. R. C., sec. 1622(h), added by sec. 2 of the Current Tax Payment
Act of 1943.
'TAt p. 44.
1s(1941) 314 U. S. 326, 62 Sup. Ct. 272, 86 L. Ed. 249. Cf. Comits-
sioner of Internal Revenue v. Heminger, (1943) 64 Sup. Ct. 249, in which
the Court, in a somewhat similar case, pointed out that it did not "have
the benefit of an interpretative departmental regulation," referring to the
Textile-Mills Securities Corporation case.
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an "interpretative regulation." The Court then referred to the
common law cases dealing with lobbying contracts and said that
the general policy indicated by those cases may be considered in
the promulgation of regulations.
,As already indicated, regulations sometmes serve another
function, viz., to settle points as to which the statute is ambiguous.
The courts give great weight to the regulations under such circumi-
stances," particularly when their promulgation was substantially
contemporaneous with the enactment of the statute and they have
had long continued operation."'
-\nother factor often emphasized, and perhaps over-emphasized.
by the courts is the reenactment of a statute without change after
the promulgation of a regulation under the earlier statute. That
question has arisen most frequently in connection with revenue
acts because of the practice until recently to reenact large parts
of the revenue statutes every few years. The profession was rather
startled by the apparently extreme position taken in Helvering ,
R. J Reviolds Tobacco Company,2- in which the court seemed to
say that Congress had approved the administrative construction
and thereby given it the force of law, and further that the adnin-
istrative officers were powerless to amend the regulation without
a declaration by Congress. However, the old regulation had been
long continued and uniform, and the specific question was whether
19A statement of the rule may be found in Fawcus Machine Company
v. United States, (1931) 282 U. S. 375, 51 Sup. Ct. 144, 75 L. Ed. 397 That
case involved a regulation construing the excess profits tax provisions of
the Revenue Act of 1918. Speaking of those regulations, which were issued
under a general statutory authority "to make all needful rules and regula-
tions for the enforcement of the provisions of this Act," Mr. Justice Roberts
said (page 378)
"They are valid unless unreasonable or inconsistent with the statute.
* * * They constitute contemporaneous construction by those charged
with the adninistration of the act, are for that reason entitled to respect-
ful consideration, and will no be overruled except for weighty reasons."
Among the numerous general provisions for regulations in the Internal
Revenue Code are. I.R.C.. sec. 62 (income tax) 3450 (mnufacturers
excise and import taxes), 3791 (a) (all internal revenue taxes, with certain
named exceptions) A useful provision is I. R. C., sec. 3791 (b)
"Retroactivity of Regulations or Rulings.-The Secretary or the
Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe the
extent, if any, to which any ruling, regulation, or Treasury Decision,
relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied without retro-
active effect."
2
0 1n Magruder v. Washington. Baltimore '& Annapolis Realty Corp..(1942) 316 U. S. 69, 62 Sup. Ct. 922, 86 L. Ed. 1278, the court, in
sustaining the validity of a regulation, stated that the particular article of
the regulations "is both a contemporary and a long standing administrative
interpretation" and that such "interpretative regulations" are "appropriate
aids" in eliminating "confusion and uncertainty."
21(1939) 306 U. S. 110, 59 Sup. Ct. 423, 83 L. Ed. 536.
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the amendment to the regulation could be applied retroactively;
the court left open the question whether the regulation could be
amended even for the future. Within less than a year, the court
clarified the situation considerably in Helvering v. Il'iishire Oil
Company.2 2 That case leaves little doubt that prospective regula-
tions may be valid without further Congressional action even
though the contrary earlier regulations have been followed by
reenactment of the statute. This subject of reenactment has been
illuminated by a number of law review articles 23 At all events,
reenactment in the revenue field has become of less importance
since the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code in 1939, be-
cause reenactment of all or large parts of the Code has not taken
place.
A recent tendency with respect to both statutes and regulations
should be noted. The legislators and administrators have become
increasingly aware of the importance of tax forms which have to
be filled out by taxpayers. For that reason statutes and regulations
are being frained-to make such forms as simple and easily under-
stood as possible. An example is Supplement T of. Chapter 1 of
the Internal Revenue Code. as amended, and the regulations
promulgated thereunder, which have resulted in a short form
(Form ,1040A) for optional use by individuals having gross in-
come from certain sources of less than $3,000. The statute itself
includes a detailed table showing the tax under varying circum-
stances.
Turning now to so-called legislative regulations, they are
designed to carry out broad and general statutory directions.
'Probably the best example in tlhe internal revenue regulations is
to be found in the regulations on consolidated returns, author-
ized by Section 141 of the Internal Revenue Code. as amended.
The statute provides that an affiliated group of corporations shall
have the privilege of making consolidated income and excess-
-2(1939) 308 U. S. 90, 60 Sup. Ct. 18, 84 L. Ed. 101. Cf. American
Chicle Co. v. United States, (1942) 316 U. S. 450, 62 up. 1114. 86 L.
Ed. 1591. In this connection see I.R.C., sec. 3791(b), quoted in n. 19, supra.
-
3Lee, Legislative and Interpretive Regulations, (1940) 29 Georgetown
L. Journ. 1, 26-29; Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil
Case, (1940) 40 Col. L. Rev. 252; Surrey, The Scope and Effect of Treas-
ury Regulations under the Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes, (1940) 88 U. of
Pa. L. Rev. 556; Paul, Use and Abuse of Tax Regulations in Statutory
Construction, (1940) 49 Yale L. Journ. 660, republished, with some changes,
in Paul, Studies in Taxation, Third Series, 420; Brown, Regulations, Re-
enactment, and the Revenue Acts, (1941) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 377, Griswold,
A Summary of the Regulations Problem (1941), 54 Harv. L. Rev. 398 and
1323, Feller, Addendum to the Regulations Problem, (1941) 54 Harv. L.
Rev. 1311.
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profits tax returns in lieu of separate returns, subject, however,
to consent to the regulations. The Commissioner, with the approval
of the Secretary, is directed to prescribe regulations to con form to
the following standard
"* * * that the tax liability of any affiliated group of cor-
porations making consolidated income- and excess-profits
tax returns and of each corporation in the group, both
during and after the period of affiliation. may be returned,
determined, computed, assessed. collected, and adjusted,
in such manner as clearly to reflect the income- and excess-
profits tax liability and the various tactors necessary for
the determination of such liability, and in order to prevent
avoidance of such tax liability"
Under that rather general direction, elaborate regulations have
been prescribed.-" The constitutional theory of this delegation of
power is discussed in the Senate Cominuttee Report 2 on the similar
provision in the bill which became the Revenue Act of 1928. The
Committee stated
"* * * The committee believes it to be impracticable to at-
tempt by legislation to prescribe the various detailed and
complicated rules necessary to meet the many differing and
complicated situations. -\ccordingly it has found it neces-
sary to delegate power to the Commissioner to prescribe
regulations legislative in character covering them. The
standard prescribed by the section keeps the delegation
from being a delegation of pure legislative power and is
vell within the rules established by the Supreme Court.
* * * Furthermore, the section requires that all the corpora-
tions joining in the filing of a consolidated return must
consent to the regulations prescribed prior to the date on
which the return is filed."
The Supreme Court has considered very recently in Comits-
sioner of Internal Rezenue v Lane-Wells Co..2 6 the effect of regu-
24Regulations 104 and 110, as amended.
25No. 960, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in C. B. 1939-1, Part 2, 409,
419. That issue of the Cumulative Bulletin contains the Committee reports
on the various Revenue Acts through the Revenue Act of 1938.
26(1944) 64 Sup. Ct. 511. Compare the earlier decisiom in the famous
case of Boske v. Comingore, (1900) 177 U. S. 459, 20 Sup. Ct. 701, 44 L.
Ed. 846. That case involved regulations issued by the Secretary of the
Treasury with respect to the disclosure of information contained ii tax re-
turns. It was held that a revenue officer, acting under the regulatmons. was
immune from liability for contempt for refusal to obey a court order, speci-
fically, he was held entitled to discharge by a Federal court upon habeas
corpus from custody of a county sheriff. The regulations were issued under
section 161 of the Revised Statutes, (U. S. C., Title V, sec. 22), which
provides "The head of each department is authorized to prescribe regula-
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lations promulgated under a similar statutory delegation. The
applicable statute 7 required a personal holding company to "make
such returns, and comply with such rules and regulations, as the
Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, may from time
to time prescribe." The regulations required a "separate return"
on Form 1120H. Failure to comply with that requirement was
held to prevent the statute of limitations from starting to run and
to result in a penalty for failure to file, even though the taxpayer
had filed the usual corporation income tax returns on Form 1120.
The court stated
"* * * Taxpayer says that the information called for by
Form 1120H is information that could have been called for
by Form 1120. We assume so, but we do not see how the
fact helps the taxpayer, for the Treasury was fully within
the statute in requiring. that information in a separate re-
turn.
"Congress has given discretion to the Commissioner to
prescribe by regulation forms of returns and has made it
the duty of the taxpayer to comply * * * The purpose is
not alone to get tax information in some form but also to
get it with such uniformity, completeness, and arrangement
that the physical task of handling and verifying returns
may be readily accomplished. For such purposes the regula-
tion requiring two separate returns for these taxes was a
reasonable and valid one * * *"
The above discussion indicates that there is a useful distinction
between "interpretative" and "legislative" regulations. However,
too much should not be expected of it; as in the case of most
tions, not inconsistent with law, for * * * the custody, use, and preservation
of the records, papers, and property appertaining to it." In commenting
upon the validity of the regulations Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the
Court, said (page 470)
"In determining whether the regulations promulgated by him are con-
sistent with law, we must apply the rule of decision which controls
when an act of Congress is assailed as not being within the powers con-
ferred upon it by the Constitution; that is to say, a regulation adopted
under section 161 of the Revised Statutes should not be disregarded or
annulled unless, in the judgment of the court, tt is plainly and palpably
inconsistent with law. Those who insist that isuch a regulation is in-
valid must make its invalidity so manifest that the court has no choice
except to hold that the Secretary has exceeded his authority and em-
ployed means that are not at all appropriate to the end specified in the
act of Congress."
27Corresponding to the present I.R.C., sec. 54(a). The Court, in stating
the statutory basis for the regulations, also referred to a general section of
the statute (corresponding to the present I.R.C., sec. 62) authorizing all
"needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title."
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legal distinctions, the categories tend to run together.-" Thus,
a legislative regulation necessarily includes an interpretalon of
the statute under which it is issued, at least with respect to the
scope of the authority conferred by the statute.
Returning to the matter of terminology, the term "interpreta-
tive" is a rather happy one, which has been used by the Supreme
Court.29 L\n alternative word is suggested by an opinion of the
Supreme Court delivered by Mr. Justice Rutledge in Merchants
A ational Bank of Boston v Com missioner of Internal Revenue.50
He referred to certain Treasury regulations, which were inter-
pretative in character, as "appropriate implementations" of a cer-
tain subsection of the Revenue Act of 1926. Thus one may speak
of interpretative or implementing regulations. By the same token,
perhaps one may speak of legislative or supplementing regulations.
The word "supplementing" at least avoids the unpleasant imlpli-
cation of a delegation of legislative power
2 The nature of the regulations involved in the IVilshire case, supra
n. 22, has been the subject of some difference of opinion. See Lee, Legislative
and Interpretive Regulations, (1940) 29 Georgetown L. Journ. 1, at p. 28,
n. 65 and p. 29, n. 66, Surrey, The Scope and Effect of Treasury Regula-
tions under the Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes, (1940) 88 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 556, 572, Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil case,
(1940) 40 Col. L. Rev 252, 256-257, Griswold, A Summary of the Regu-
lations Problem, (1941) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 398, 401, Feller, Addendum to
the Regulations Problem, (1941) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1311, 1320, n. 40.2 9In addition to the cases already referred to as using that term, see
Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., (1939) 306 U. S. 110, 114, 59
Sup. Ct. 423, 83 L. Ed. 536.30(1943) 320 U. S. 256, 64 Sup. Ct. 108.
